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Note 
Increasing E-Quality in Rural America:  
U.S. Spectrum Policy and Adverse Possession  
Lindsey L. Tonsager∗ 
Americans across the country are cutting the cords of their 
communications devices.1 In 2004, the wireless telecommunica-
tions services industry grew three times faster than the na-
tional economy, contributing $118 billion in revenue and $92 
billion to the gross domestic product.2 Meanwhile, wireless 
“hotspots” are popping up everywhere from coffee shops in New 
York City to a municipal-wide system in Chaska, Minnesota.3 
Consumers increasingly expect their communications services 
to provide mobility, an always-on connection, and advanced 
services offering voice, video, and data in one device. Moreover, 
communications devices are not just for personal communica-
tions: the public safety community, local and national busi-
nesses, and educational institutions increasingly rely on such 
services.4 
Because wireless communications services transmit infor-
mation over the electromagnetic spectrum, however, a pro-
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2004, 
University of Pennsylvania. The author thanks Dean Jim Chen for his 
thoughtful comments and insight; editors David Leishman, Stephanie Bitter-
man and Marci Windsheimer for their assistance; and Keith Tonsager for his 
patience and support. Copyright © 2006 by Lindsey L. Tonsager. 
 1. See Wireless Substitution in Full Swing, Says Study, RCR WIRELESS 
NEWS, Sept. 19, 2005, at 30 (noting that Americans are increasingly preferring 
cell phones to land-line phone services). 
 2. Susan Polyakova, Study: Wireless Industry Contributes $92 Billion to 
U.S. Economy, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 4, 2005, at 1, 1, available at 2005 WLNR 
16027163. 
 3. New Technologies, COMM. DAILY, May 27, 2004, at 1, 3, available at 
2004 WLNR 6957999. 
 4. See, e.g., Kevin J. Martin, FCC Chairman Martin Comments on Com-
mission’s Amendment Emergency Alert System (EAS) Rules to Include Digital 
Media Technologies, U.S. FED. NEWS, Nov. 3, 2005, at 1, available at 2005 
WLNR 17829277; Amol Sharma, Web Phones Complicate 9-1-1 Technology 
Needs, CQ WKLY, Oct. 10, 2005, at 2704, 2704–05. 
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vider’s services are limited according to whether adequate spec-
trum is accessible. Unfortunately, spectrum policy in the 
United States has failed to facilitate deployment of communica-
tions networks in rural America,5 where network deployment is 
costly and customers are few.6 Consequently, many rural con-
sumers remain unserved or underserved,7 while the rest of the 
country undergoes an advanced wireless services revolution. 
Even when rural consumers have access to a particular com-
munications service, the quality or speed of that service is often 
subpar. For example, the percentage of zip codes with broad-
band lines in service is lowest in rural America.8 Although 
many rural consumers own cell phones, most receive only ana-
log service because digital signal coverage is sparse.9 In some 
 
 5. See Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural 
Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to Pro-
vide Spectrum-Based Services, 33 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1162, 1246 (Sept. 
27, 2004) [hereinafter Spectrum-Based Services] (statement of Comm’r Mi-
chael J. Copps) (“Anyone who lives in rural America knows first hand that ru-
ral consumers have fewer choices of carriers, more holes in their coverage, and 
that there are still areas of our country that have no service at all.”). 
 6. See Comments of the National Telecommunications Cooperative 
Association, Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural 
Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to 
Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, at 4 (Dec. 29, 2003), 
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=
6515383228 [hereinafter Comments of the NTCA 2003]; Comments of the 
Organization for the Promotion and Advancement of Small Telecommu-
nications Companies and the Rural Telecommunications Group, Facilitating 
the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural Areas and Promoting 
Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based 
Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, at 13 (Dec. 29, 2003), http://gullfoss2.fcc 
.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6515383203 
[hereinafter Comments of OPASTCO]. 
 7. See Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Bar-
riers to the Development of Secondary Markets, 30 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 
2067, 2068–69 (Nov. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Efficient Use of Spectrum 2000] 
(discussing “the problem of underserved rural areas”); Jillian Lloyd, ‘Digital 
Age’ Skirts Rural America, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 31, 1998, at 1. 
 8. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FCC, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR 
INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004, at 5 (2005), http://www 
.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/hspd0705.pdf 
(“[A]s of December 31, 2004, high-speed subscribers are reported to be present 
in 99% of the most densely populated zip codes and in 75% of zip codes with 
the lowest population densities.”). The FCC defined “high-speed” as having a 
transmission delivery rate “to the subscriber at a speed in excess of 200 kbps 
in at least one direction.” Id. at 2. 
 9. See Chet Brokaw, State Sees Hang-ups with Switch to Digital, ABER-
DEEN AM. NEWS (S.D.), July 16, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WLNR 
11168807. 
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areas, even analog coverage is unreliable.10 Recognizing this 
problem, the Federal Communications Commission issued a no-
tice of proposed rulemaking.11 The proceeding seeks to encour-
age deployment of communications networks and improve ac-
cess to spectrum in rural America.12 As of this writing, the 
proceeding is still open before the Commission.13 
This Note argues that new and novel policy changes are 
necessary to ensure that rural residents are not left behind in 
the communications revolution. Part I discusses characteristics 
of the electromagnetic spectrum and spectrum management 
policy in the United States. Part II details why current meth-
ods of spectrum allocation fall short of ensuring access to com-
munications services in rural America. Part III argues that the 
Federal Communications Commission should enact regulations 
modeled after the doctrine of adverse possession as a means for 
a communications service provider to obtain a license transfer 
for spectrum. This Note concludes that adopting such a pro-
posal would establish an economically efficient means of ensur-
ing access to advanced services for consumers who historically 
have been underserved or not served at all. 
I.  UNITED STATES SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT POLICY 
The Federal Communications Commission is charged with 
the formulation and enforcement of the nation’s spectrum pol-
icy,14 which requires determining how to allocate, allot, and as-
sign spectrum among parties other than the federal govern-
ment.15 One must be familiar with the characteristics of 
spectrum and current United States spectrum management 
policy to understand how modifications to current policy will 
increase access to communications services in rural America. 
 
 10. Sam Burrish, Frustrations Build Over Cellular Gaps, ARGUS LEADER 
(Sioux Falls, S.D.), July 17, 2005, at 1D, available at http://www.argusleader 
.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050717/BUSINESS/507170344/1003. 
 11. Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at 1162; see also FCC, 
Proceedings and Initiatives: Spectrum-Based Services in Rural Areas, 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/spectrum/proceeding_details.htm?proid=292 (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2006) (collecting notices and releases related to the proceeding). 
 12. See Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5. 
 13. For updates and further information, see FCC, supra note 11. 
 14. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2000). 
 15. See HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW 239 
(1999). The National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA) manages use of spectrum by the federal government. Id. at 238. 
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A. CHARACTERISTICS OF SPECTRUM 
Understanding how and why the federal government man-
ages spectrum use requires an appreciation of the nature of 
electromagnetic waves and the electromagnetic spectrum, how 
information is conveyed over electromagnetic waves, and the 
physical limitations of spectrum. Electromagnetic waves are 
characterized by their frequency, wavelength, and amplitude.16 
The following diagram represents these concepts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From point A to point B is one cycle. Frequency is the 
number of cycles per second and is measured in hertz; wave-
length is the distance the wave travels in one cycle.17 The dis-
tance C represents the wave’s amplitude, which determines the 
signal’s strength.18 The electromagnetic spectrum can be con-
ceptualized as a long electromagnetic wave with an ever-
increasing frequency, with very low frequency waves at one end 
and cosmic rays at the other.19 
Communications devices operate using only a small portion 
of the electromagnetic spectrum, known as the radio spectrum. 
This portion includes those electromagnetic waves with fre-
 
 16. WALTER B. EMERY, BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT 99 (1971). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Kulpreet Singh, The FCC’s Pioneer’s Preference Policy: An Innovative 
Idea Grows Old and Weary, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 143, 147 
(1996). 
 19. See EMERY, supra note 16, at 100; Nat’l Telecomm. Info. Admin., 
United States Frequency Allocations: The Radio Spectrum (2003), http://www 
.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/allochrt.pdf. 
A 
B 
C 
Time 
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quencies ranging from 3 kHz to 400 GHz.20 The FCC has di-
vided the radio spectrum into several bands of frequencies that 
it then allocates for particular services.21 Radios and televi-
sions, for example, operate at lower frequencies of the radio 
spectrum. Mobile phones generally operate somewhere in the 
middle, and satellite television operates on the higher end of 
the radio spectrum.22 
Different signal frequencies within this spectrum have dif-
ferent propagation characteristics. Some frequencies rapidly 
diminish in intensity and therefore are capable of traveling 
only short distances, whereas other frequencies are capable of 
traveling thousands of miles.23 Some frequencies are able to 
penetrate structures like concrete buildings,24 while tree 
leaves25 and rain26 easily frustrate others. These propagation 
characteristics partially explain why a radio station fades out 
as one drives away from the transmitting tower. They also ex-
plain why “bunny-ear” television broadcast receivers work well 
indoors, while a satellite dish requires placement outside or 
near a window. 
Thousands of wireless communications devices and a wide 
range of technologies rely on spectrum to transmit information. 
They include mobile phones, wireless internet, broadcast tele-
vision, satellites, remote-controlled toys, and even garage door 
openers. Information in the form of voice, video, or data is 
transposed onto these electromagnetic waves, allowing for 
point-to-point and multipoint information transfer.27 After one 
enters information into an input device, like a microphone,28 a 
transmitter converts the voice, video, or data into an electronic 
signal through the process of modulation.29 This signal travels 
 
 20. See 47 C.F.R. § 2.106 (2005); NAT’L TELECOMM. INFO. ADMIN., supra 
note 19. 
 21. 47 C.F.R. § 2.106; NAT’L TELECOMM. INFO. ADMIN., supra note 19. 
 22. 47 C.F.R. § 2.106; NAT’L TELECOMM. INFO. ADMIN., supra note 19. 
 23. See EMERY, supra note 16, at 100–02. 
 24. See Robert K. Morrow Jr. & Theodore S. Rappaport, Getting In, WIRE-
LESS REV., Mar. 1, 2000, at 42, 42–44. 
 25. Tim Kridel, Foliage Spoilage, WIRELESS REV., March 1, 2000, at 50, 
50–51. 
 26. Mike Mead, Propagation Impairment at 28GHz, AM.’S NETWORK, June 
15, 1998, at S-17, S-17 to -19. 
 27. See ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 234–38. 
 28. See ROGER L. FREEMAN, TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRANSMISSION 
HANDBOOK 1–2 (4th ed. 1998). 
 29. Singh, supra note 18, at 148. 
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through the air and a receiver, like a radio, intercepts it. The 
receiver converts the signal back to voice, video, or data 
through the process of demodulation.30 
Interference, however, frustrates these radio transmis-
sions. Interference manifests as a snowy television channel, a 
crackling radio station, or a garage door that refuses to open.31 
It occurs when another signal operates on the same or an adja-
cent channel and is sufficiently powerful.32 For example, an FM 
radio station listener sometimes may hear two programs com-
peting against each other—each station fading in and out be-
tween unintelligible static. As one station’s signal gets suffi-
ciently weaker than the other, the stronger signal is audible. 
However, when each is relatively equal in strength, the listener 
hears static.  
If the supply of spectrum were infinite, providers would not 
have to worry about operating too closely to another channel. 
Spectrum is not an infinite resource, though. Only a limited 
number of operators may utilize the spectrum at any given 
time without causing interference.33 Consequently, spectrum 
scarcity is different from that of gasoline or water—one user’s 
“consumption of a broadcast signal does not exhaust or reduce 
what can be received by others.”34 Consumption of a broadcast 
signal thus poses no supply difficulties; however, increased 
transmission does. It may be useful to think of spectrum as a 
dance floor. The dance floor can accommodate many dancers, 
the communications operators. They can move across the floor 
among each other, each dancer occupying a portion of the floor. 
However, at some point too many dancers will make the dance 
floor too crowded, and people will start stepping on each other’s 
feet and bumping into each other. 
New technology and compression techniques use existing 
spectrum more efficiently and increase the range of available 
spectrum.35 For example, the conversion from analog to digital 
 
 30. See FREEMAN, supra note 28, at 1–2. 
 31. See Elizabeth Williamson, Stuck in the Driveway for Security: New 
Emergency Radio System Jams Garage Openers, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2005, 
at C5. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See Adam Cain, Comment, Satellite Radio: An Innovative Technology’s 
Path Through the FCC and into the Future, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. 
JUDGES 223, 228 (2005). 
 34. ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 228. 
 35. See id. 
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allows for more content in the same amount of bandwidth.36 
Additionally, new devices can operate using higher frequencies 
than were previously available.37 At the same time, however, 
demand for spectrum increases as new services and devices 
emerge.38 Therefore, it is unlikely that interference concerns 
will subside in the near future. In response, spectrum man-
agement policy seeks to encourage the development of spec-
trum-efficient technologies and to otherwise minimize the risk 
of interference. 
B. THE FCC LICENSING REQUIREMENT 
The foundation of spectrum management policy lies in the 
FCC’s licensing scheme. The FCC assigns licenses for the use of 
the electromagnetic spectrum39 and prohibits persons without a 
license from transmitting signals over much of the radio spec-
trum.40 The licensing system aims to prevent interference and 
to protect and promote the public interest.41 It also allows the 
federal government to retain control over spectrum manage-
ment, preventing individual parties from claiming bands of 
spectrum as private property. The Telecommunications Act 
states: 
It is the purpose of this chapter . . . to maintain the control of the 
United States over all the channels of radio transmission; and to pro-
vide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by 
persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal  
 
 
 
 36. See, e.g., Anne Marie Squeo & Joe Flint, Move to Digital Pits TV Sta-
tions Against Cable, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2005, at B4 (noting that television 
stations are able to split their current analog signals into as many as six dif-
ferent digital signals). 
 37. ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 228. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). 
 40. See, e.g., id.; FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 
(D.C. Cir. 1940) (“The fundamental purpose of Congress in respect of broad-
casting was the allocation and regulation of the use of radio frequencies by 
prohibiting such use except under license.”). Devices such as garage door 
openers, and services such as wireless internet, operate on unlicensed spec-
trum. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.301–.323 (2005). 
 41. Writers Guild of Am. v. ABC, 609 F.2d 355, 362 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he 
Communications Act makes the interests of the public paramount.”); Todisco 
v. United States, 298 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1961) (“[T]he purpose of the li-
censing law is to prevent interference with radio communications.”); WOKO, 
Inc. v. FCC, 109 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (“The underlying policy of the 
Communications Act is the securing and protection of the public interest.”). 
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authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any right, 
beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.42 
The license is also subject to modification43 and revoca-
tion.44 Nevertheless, licensees possess several significant prop-
erty interests in the spectrum, including the right to lease, dis-
aggregate, and partition excess spectrum through secondary 
markets.45 Additionally, incumbent broadcasters have a re-
newal expectancy, which “is a presumption in favor of license 
renewal.”46 These property interests are commonly referred to 
as the licensee’s “quasi-property rights.”47 
The public interest standard guides the Commission’s deci-
sion to grant or deny an application for a license. Under this 
standard, the Commission must “determine, in the case of each 
application filed with it . . . whether the public interest, conven-
ience, and necessity will be served by the granting of such ap-
plication.”48 In choosing between mutually exclusive applica-
tions for a license, the FCC must “grant the license or permit to 
a qualified applicant through a system of competitive bid-
ding.”49 Consequently, the Commission often uses auctions to 
allocate spectrum licenses and awards the licenses to the high-
est bidder.50 The spectrum license indicates the particular fre-
 
 42. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (emphasis added); see also id. § 304 (“No station li-
cense shall be granted . . . until the applicant therefor shall have waived any 
claim to the use of any particular frequency or of the electromagnetic spectrum 
as against the regulatory power of the United States because of the previous 
use of the same, whether by license or otherwise.” (emphasis added)); Sanders 
Bros., 309 U.S. at 475 (“The policy of the Act is clear that no person is to have 
anything in the nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a li-
cense.”); Trinity Methodist Church, S. v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850, 853 (D.C. Cir. 
1932). 
 43. 47 U.S.C. § 316 (2000). 
 44. Id. § 312. 
 45. See L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 170 F.2d 793, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1948) 
(“[T]he right under a license for a definite term . . . is more than a mere privi-
lege or gratuity.”); Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at 1166 n.20, 1173 
(discussing partitioning and disaggregation); Promoting Efficient Use of Spec-
trum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Mar-
kets, 30 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 661, 665 (Oct. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Efficient 
Use of Spectrum 2003] (discussing the right to lease). 
 46. J. Gregory Sidak, An Economic Theory of Censorship, 11 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 81, 98–100 (2004). 
 47. See, e.g., Joseph M. Ward, Comment, Secondary Markets in Spectrum: 
Making Spectrum Policy As Flexible As the Spectrum Market It Must Foster, 
10 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 103, 111 (2001). 
 48. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (2000). 
 49. Id. § 309(j). 
 50. See Ward, supra note 47, at 110 (2001). For an example of how a spec-
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quencies, geographic area covered, particular services to be 
provided, and technologies that may be used.51 The license is 
statutorily limited, generally to eight or ten years, at which 
time the licensee must apply for renewal.52 The statute prohib-
its any unauthorized transmission.53 
Under Congressional mandate, the Commission must give 
particular attention to communications services in rural areas. 
The Commission’s purpose is to ensure access to wire and radio 
communications “to all the people of the United States.”54 Addi-
tionally, the statutory scheme specifically requires the FCC to 
fashion its licensing system so as to ensure access to communi-
cations services in rural America. Section 309 provides: 
In identifying classes of licenses and permits to be issued by competi-
tive bidding, in specifying eligibility and other characteristics of such 
licenses and permits, and in designing the methodologies for use un-
der this subsection, the Commission shall . . . seek to promote . . . the 
development and rapid deployment of new technologies, products, and 
services for the benefit of the public, including those residing in rural 
areas . . . .55 
In light of this responsibility, the FCC has adopted several 
allocation methods and put forth several proposals to make cer-
tain that rural providers not only are able to participate in the 
spectrum auction, but can also access the capital necessary to 
compete in the spectrum marketplace. 
C. CURRENT AND PROPOSED SPECTRUM ALLOCATION METHODS 
The Commission has taken several steps to facilitate rural 
providers’ participation in license auctions. One step has been 
to grant licenses based on geographic areas.56 The Commission 
 
trum auction is conducted, see Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services 
in the 1.7 GHz and 2.1 GHz Bands, 36 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 648 (Aug. 5, 
2005) [hereinafter Service Rules]. 
 51. Evan R. Kwerel & John R. Williams, Moving Toward a Market for 
Spectrum, 16 REG. 53, 53–54 (1993). 
 52. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1) (2000) (limiting a license for the operation of 
a broadcasting station to eight years); 47 C.F.R. § 27.13 (2005) (setting the li-
cense period for various frequencies at either eight or “up to ten” years). 
 53. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). 
 54. Id. § 151 (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. § 309(j)(3)–(4). 
 56. See Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Dedicated 
Short-Range Communication Services in the 5.850-5.925 GHz Band (5.9 GHz 
Band), 31 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 2121, 2134–35 (Nov. 15, 2002) [hereinafter 
Rules Regarding 5.9 GHz Band] (discussing the advantages of geographic li-
censing). 
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allocates spectrum at auction by using geographic-area licens-
ing,57 which authorizes the licensee to operate on the relevant 
frequency anywhere within the specified geographic area.58 The 
Commission divides auctioned spectrum into several frequency 
blocks59 and assigns each band a geographic designation.60 This 
designation indicates how many licenses the Commission will 
auction in each particular band. The designations range from 
large license areas, like the regional economic area groupings 
(REAGs), to small areas, such as cellular market areas 
(CMAs).61 Under the REAG method, the Commission awards 
twelve licenses, of which only six are in the continental United 
States.62 In comparison, there are 734 CMA licenses63 and 176 
economic area (EA) licenses.64 The number of licenses corre-
lates inversely with the size of the area—the more licenses, the 
smaller the size of each geographic area. The size of a geo-
graphic area for a particular frequency block, therefore, can 
vary significantly depending on its designation. 
The Commission offers both large and small geographic 
service areas at auction, in an attempt to accommodate the 
needs of both large and small providers.65 For example, in the 
 
 57. Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at 1171. 
 58. Dave Molta, Regulating the Airwaves, NETWORK COMPUTING, Aug. 5, 
2004, at G12, G12. 
 59. For an example of how the FCC divided the broadband PCS band, see 
John A. Rogovin & Rodger D. Citron, Lessons from the Nextwave Saga: The 
Federal Communications Commission, The Courts, and the Use of Market 
Forms to Perform Public Functions, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 687, 697 (2005). 
 60.  For an example of how the FCC divided the AWS band and assigned 
geographic designations, see Service Rules, supra note 50, at 651–59. 
 61. The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau provides a listing and de-
scriptions of the various geographic licensing schemes the FCC has used in its 
auctions. Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, FCC, Maps: Geographic Licensing 
Schemes, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=maps (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2006). 
 62. Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, FCC, Regional Economic Area Groupings 
Map, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/maps/reag.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 
2006) [hereinafter REAG Map]. 
 63. Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, FCC, Cellular Market Areas Map, 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/maps/rsamsa.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 
2006). 
 64. Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, FCC, Economic Areas Map, 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/maps/ea.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2006) 
[hereinafter EA Map]. 
 65. Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at 1210 (“In recent years, the 
Commission has continued to embrace geographic area licensing . . . to ac-
commodate licenses encompassing very large service areas as opposed to 
smaller site-based licenses.”). 
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upcoming auction for advanced wireless services in the 1.7 GHz 
and 2.1 GHz band, the FCC is auctioning different bands of 
spectrum using REAGs, EAs, and CMAs.66 Large geographic 
service areas benefit providers with a national footprint,67 be-
cause with only one transaction, they are able to cover much of 
their service area.68 There is no need to negotiate aggregation 
agreements with other bidders or license winners; thus trans-
action costs are reduced. Conversely, small providers prefer 
small geographic service areas, which are typically auctioned at 
lower prices and more closely match their local footprints.69 
EAs attempt to balance these competing interests. They can be 
combined to form REAGs,70 but are small enough to be rela-
tively affordable for small providers.71 
Moreover, the Commission mitigates the impact of dispa-
rate access to capital markets by offering bidding credits to ru-
ral telephone companies and small businesses through the des-
ignated entity program.72 Each particular auction’s service 
rules specify the bidding credit levels available for rural tele-
phone companies.73 The bidding credit level for small busi-
nesses varies from 15 to 35 percent; the smaller the company,  
 
 
 
 66. See Service Rules, supra note 50, at 648, 652. 
 67. A footprint is “that portion of the Earth's surface over which a satellite 
antenna delivers a specified amount of signal power under specified condi-
tions.” INST. FOR TELECOMM. SCIENCES, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., 
TELECOM GLOSSARY (2000), http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/dir-016/_2287 
.htm. 
 68. See Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission’s Rules—Competitive 
Bidding Procedures, 21 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1231, 1252 (Aug. 14, 2000) 
(noting that large service areas may be appropriate for satellite-based ser-
vices). 
 69. See, e.g., Comments of the National Telecommunications Cooperative 
Association, Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural 
Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to 
Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No. 04-356, at 2–3 (Nov. 23, 
2004), http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_ 
document=6516883063. 
 70. Compare EA Map, supra note 64, with REAG Map, supra note 62. 
 71. See Service Rules, supra note 50, at 648 (“EA licensing areas offer[ ] 
realistic opportunities for local, largely rural carriers to afford adequate spec-
trum for voice and advanced data services in markets of manageable size 
suited to their existing operations.”). 
 72. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(f) (2005). 
 73. See id. 
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as defined by statute, the greater the deduction.74 A bidding 
credit is the equivalent of a “payment discount.”75 After the 
bidding process is complete, the FCC deducts this pre-
determined percentage from the actual bid price. The desig-
nated entity pays only this reduced price for the license.76 
The Commission recognizes that these methods, along with 
others not discussed here,77 have not been sufficiently success-
ful at getting spectrum into the hands of rural providers. Thus, 
the Commission has increasingly relied on secondary markets 
as a means to meet the spectrum needs of rural providers.78 For 
example, if a geographic service area exceeds the licensee’s 
footprint, the licensee may lease, partition, or disaggregate ex-
cess spectrum to another provider, often a small rural carrier.79 
The Commission has also considered whether alternative or 
supplemental methods are needed to facilitate spectrum access 
in rural areas.80 One approach is the “keep what you use” pol-
icy, under which the Commission would reclaim fallow spec-
trum and relicense it to other providers if not used within a 
specified time.81 The Commission has also considered whether 
to adopt an easement policy or substantial service require-
ments for license renewal.82 
 
 
 
 74. Id. § 1.2110(f)(2)(i)–(iii). 
 75. Id. § 1.2110(f). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Other methods include a competitive bidding process for initial licens-
ing, base station power level rules, substantial service and construction re-
quirements, infrastructure sharing limitations, and rural utilities service loan 
program policies. See Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at 1164–66. 
 78. See Efficient Use of Spectrum 2003, supra note 45, at 663–65 (high-
lighting “efforts to facilitate secondary markets in spectrum”). 
 79. See 47 C.F.R. § 27.15; Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at 
1172–74 (“Geographic partitioning and spectrum disaggregation are available 
to promote efficient spectrum use and economic opportunity by a wide range of 
applicants, including rural telephone companies.”). 
 80. Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at 1165 (“In December 2002, 
the Commission released a Notice of Inquiry that sought comment on the ef-
fectiveness of its existing regulatory tools in promoting service to rural areas 
and asked how we could modify our policies to further encourage the provision 
of wireless services in rural areas.”). 
 81. Id. at 1213–16. The FCC has already applied the keep-what-you-use 
approach to some services. See id. at 1174–76 & nn.103–04 (discussing the cel-
lular and PCS approaches). 
 82. Id. at 1216–19. 
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II.  CURRENT AND PROPOSED ALLOCATION  
METHODS ARE INSUFFICIENT 
In some respects, the current and alternative spectrum 
management methods are a step in the right direction. For ex-
ample, utilizing diverse geographic-area licensing, designated-
entity bidding credits,83 and secondary markets has made great 
communications inroads into some of the most isolated areas of 
the country.84 Each of these methods, however, has also created 
more difficulties. Geographic-area licensing results in economic 
inefficiency; secondary markets are underutilized and often 
force unfavorable terms onto small rural providers; and a keep-
what-you use system is both economically inefficient and would 
likely fail to increase services in rural areas. This Part explores 
each of these difficulties. 
A. GEOGRAPHIC-AREA LICENSING AND ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCY 
It is extremely difficult to structure an auction that both 
facilitates the provision of rural services and avoids frustrating 
the footprints of national providers.85 The Commission must 
both determine what size geographic areas to use and in which 
frequency bands to use them.86 Such decisions depend not only 
on technical factors, like propagation characteristics and ser-
vice allocations, but also on a prediction of what the providers’ 
future spectrum needs will be. If the Commission errs on the 
side of making the geographic areas too large, licensees end up 
with excess spectrum that other bidders may have otherwise 
used.87 Conversely, if the geographic areas are too small, na-
tional providers may have difficulty acquiring the spectrum 
 
 83. See Service Rules, supra note 50, at 648, 660–61 (noting the success of 
designated entities in winning licenses in several recent spectrum auctions). 
 84. See Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at 1165–68 (referring to 
the success certain policies have had in providing wireless services in rural 
areas). 
 85. See Rules Regarding 5.9 GHz Band, supra note 56, at 23,165. 
 86. For example, in the upcoming Advanced Wireless Services Auction for 
the 1710–1755 and 2110–2155 MHz bands, frequencies in Block A will be li-
censed as EAs. Blocks B, C, and E will be licensed as REAGs. Only Block D 
will be licensed using CMAs. Service Rules, supra note 50, at 648, 651. 
 87. See Comments of Rural Cellular Association, Facilitating the Provi-
sion of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural Areas and Promoting Opportunities 
for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT 
Docket No. 02-381, at 12 (Dec. 29, 2003), http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/ 
retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6515383162 (“The effect of ex-
cessively large or inefficiently sized geographic license areas is a lost opportu-
nity to allow spectrum to reach an entity that would make better use of it.”). 
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necessary to cover their footprint.88 Mutually destructive bid-
ding—where a bidder is left with an incomplete license set that 
has a total price greater than its value—may occur.89 Although 
EAs attempt to balance the needs of national and rural provid-
ers, they do not offer an efficient solution because aggregation 
by large providers and partitioning by small providers involve 
transaction costs.90 
B. SECONDARY MARKETS 
Secondary markets provide the means of correcting some of 
these inefficiencies by allowing re-allocation of fallow spec-
trum.91 Under this method, large providers partition or disag-
gregate small portions of their geographic area to rural provid-
ers.92 Leasing portions of the spectrum is also an option.93 
However, these transactions raise several difficulties. 
First, each secondary market transaction involves signifi-
cant transaction costs,94 which the national provider may not 
 
 88. See Peter Cramton, The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions, 41 
J.L. & ECON. 727, 730–31, 733–34 (1998) (discussing how large providers ag-
gregated licenses in nine FCC spectrum auctions from 1994 to 1996). The au-
thor recognizes that some providers had to pay more in order to acquire spec-
trum needed in adjacent bands and that it is sometimes difficult to convince 
the neighboring licensee holder to transfer the spectrum rights. Id. at 730–31. 
 89. Lawrence M. Ausubel et al., Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence 
from the Broadband PCS Auctions, 6 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 497, 499–
500 (1997). 
 90. See Comments of the National Telecommunications Cooperative 
Association, Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural 
Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to 
Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, at 6 (Jan. 14, 2005), 
http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_ 
document=6516887645 [hereinafter Comments of the NTCA 2005] (“There are 
costs involved with negotiating with another carrier to make spectrum 
available in secondary markets and the financial gain may not be worth the 
trouble for the large carrier.”). 
 91. See Efficient Use of Spectrum 2000, supra note 7, at 2067 (noting that 
“enabling the development of more robust secondary markets will help pro-
mote spectrum efficiency and full utilization” by facilitating the use of “spec-
trum [that is] used inefficiently by its current licensees or . . . lie[s] fallow”); 
Ward, supra note 47, at 104. 
 92. See Efficient Use of Spectrum 2000, supra note 7, at 2068–71 (summa-
rizing various leasing arrangements). 
 93. See Ward, supra note 47, at 104.  
 94. Peter Cramton, Spectrum Auctions, in HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS ECONOMICS 605, 609 (Martin Cave, Sumit Majumdar, & Ingo Vogel-
sang eds., 2002) (“[T]ransaction costs are not zero. Postauction transactions 
often are made difficult by strategic behavior between parties with private in-
formation and market power . . . . The problem is that the license holder exer-
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be willing to absorb95 and the rural provider may not be able to 
afford. Second, large providers may be unwilling to partition 
spectrum, based on an economic calculation that it could be the 
“beachfront” property of the future, even though it currently is 
not profitable. The communications industry is constantly 
changing. New technologies and federal regulations, like band-
clearing96 and relocation,97 alter the way providers make deci-
sions. These changes potentially could make spectrum in even 
rural areas extremely profitable. 
Third, large providers may be unwilling to partition be-
cause they believe large spectrum areas will be more attractive 
to future buyers, increasing the purchase price.98 Fourth, rural 
providers may be unwilling to lease spectrum. Because provid-
ing communications services involves significant capital in-
vestment, a rural provider may hesitate to take on such in-
vestment without some assurance the lease will be renewed, 
and on favorable terms. The statutory limits on the length of 
FCC licenses99 frustrate the possibility of long-term leases. 
Even if the licensee and the rural provider could agree on a 
long-term lease based on the licensee’s renewal expectancy, the 
licensee likely would be cautious to do so because encumbered 
spectrum will be difficult to sell to future buyers, or will at 
least fetch a lower price. Put differently, the longer the lease 
terms, the more likely that problems associated with partition-
ing will arise. Finally, with respect to both partitioning and 
leasing, when large providers obtain licenses that cover areas 
larger than their own footprint and overlap the service areas of 
rural providers, the parties have vastly unequal bargaining 
power when it comes to negotiating the terms of the deal.100 
 
cises its substantial market power in the resale of the license.”). 
 95. Comments of OPASTCO, supra note 6, at 11. 
 96. See Neil Roland, Deadline Set for Digital-TV Conversion, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, Dec. 20, 2005, at E1 (discussing legislation requiring television broad-
casters to move to digital signals so that emergency service workers could use 
the analog waves). 
 97. See Peter Cramton et al., Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents, 
41 J.L. & ECON. 647, 647–48 (1998). 
 98. Comments of OPASTCO, supra note 6, at 11. 
 99. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1) (2000) (limiting the license for operation of a 
broadcasting station to eight years); 47 C.F.R. § 27.13 (2005) (setting the li-
cense period for various frequencies at either eight or ten years). 
 100. See Comments of Rural Cellular Association, Facilitating the 
Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural Areas and Promoting 
Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based 
Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, at 3 (Jan. 13, 2005), http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/ 
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These concerns present real barriers to participation in the 
secondary markets. Although some rural providers claim that 
the secondary market rules have increased their access to spec-
trum,101 such instances typically involve rural providers form-
ing cooperative ventures with a national company.102 For vari-
ous reasons, few rural providers desire to be in such a position. 
Some providers fear losing their designated entity status if they 
enter into such an agreement.103 Rural providers may wish to 
avoid the unfavorable terms included in such deals, such as 
disadvantageous roaming or pricing provisions, and limits on 
the types of technology they can use.104 One commenter noted 
that “[t]he small operator also must accept the large carrier’s 
imposition of complexity in the transaction and the ongoing op-
erating standards, all of which exacerbate the expense for the 
small company.”105 Providers who prefer a small size and com-
munity focus simply may want to remain independent from the 
large, national providers. Others may be unable to enter into 
such partnerships because of various antitrust or cross-
ownership limitations. 
 
 
prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6516887547 
[hereinafter Comments of RCA]. 
 101. For example, Nextel Partners, Inc. noted that these rules “allowed 
Nextel Partners to obtain hundreds of partitioned spectrum blocks [and] spec-
trum usage rights to thousands of station licenses under Commission-
approved leasing arrangements.” Comments of Nextel Partners, Inc. on Fur-
ther Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-
Based Services to Rural Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Tele-
phone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, 
at iii (Jan. 14, 2005), http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_ 
pdf=pdf&id_document=6516887636 [hereinafter Comments of Nextel Part-
ners]. 
 102. Id. at 3, 6 (“Nextel Partners has undertaken this buildout in major 
part using economic area (EA) licenses originally purchased by Nextel Com-
munications at auction from the Commission.”). Sprint has formed similar al-
liances. See Sprint Reply Comments, Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-
Based Services to Rural Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Tele-
phone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, 
at 7–8 (Feb. 14, 2005), http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_ 
pdf=pdf&id_document=6517288314. 
 103. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110 (2005). Depending on the service rules for the 
particular auction, either a rural provider or a provider claiming to be a small 
business may be ineligible for a bidding credit due to the increased financial 
support from a large provider. See id. 
 104. Comments of RCA, supra note 100, at 3 (“Roaming rates are specified 
by the large carrier in a ‘take it or leave it’ fashion because the large carrier 
has little or nothing to lose if no deal is reached.”). 
 105. Id. 
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Absent a partnership with a larger provider, many rural 
providers claim they face difficulties when trying to acquire ad-
ditional spectrum through the secondary markets.106 They ar-
gue that the secondary market method is “lengthy, burden-
some, and often, unsuccessful.”107 Large carriers often fail to 
answer a small provider’s inquiries or refuse to do business 
with them.108 In at least one documented instance, a small, ru-
ral provider was told that it did not have enough customers to 
make an agreement worthwhile.109 The Organization for the 
Promotion and Advancement of Small Telecommunications 
Companies and the Rural Telecommunications Group claim 
that providers have partitioned or disaggregated “far less than 
a quarter of one percent of all the licenses sold at auction.”110 
C. KEEP WHAT YOU USE 
Perhaps the most controversial proposal is the keep-what-
you-use method,111 under which the Commission reclaims fal-
low spectrum and relicenses it to other providers if not used 
within a specified time.112 This allocation method is the most 
inefficient and the least likely to facilitate the provision of 
communications services in rural areas. It is highly inefficient 
because it requires the FCC to determine through field testing 
what spectrum a licensee is using and what spectrum lies fal-
low.113 The Commission must then determine which providers 
 
 106. See, e.g., Comments of the NTCA 2005, supra note 90, at 3. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Comments of OPASTCO, supra note 6, at 10. 
 111. Compare Comments of the NTCA 2005, supra note 90, at 4–8 
(supporting the keep-what-you-use approach), with Reply Comments of 
Cingular Wireless, Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to 
Rural Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to 
Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, at 2–6 (Feb. 14, 
2005), http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_ 
document=6517288274 (arguing that a keep-what-you-use approach is 
“draconian regulation”), and Reply Comments of AT&T Wireless Services, 
Inc., Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural Areas and 
Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide 
Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, at 4–9 (Jan. 26, 2004), 
http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_ 
document=6515583742 [hereinafter Reply Comments of AT&T] (arguing that 
a keep-what-you-use approach is unnecessary). 
 112. Spectrum-Based Services, supra note 5, at 1213–16 (summarizing 
keep-what-you-use relicensing measures). 
 113. See id. at 1214 (discussing the difficulties of assessing spectrum use). 
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should receive access to the unused spectrum instead.114 Such 
oversight is likely to be time- and resource-intensive because 
both of these procedures involve high transaction costs.115 
Moreover, the benefits to be gained from such a reclama-
tion policy are likely minimal. Rural providers face the same 
high economic hurdles to deployment as do national providers, 
and they lack the advantages of economies of scale. Conse-
quently, although keep-what-you-use increases rural access to 
spectrum, rural providers working under this method will not 
necessarily be able to deploy rural communications networks 
and provide advanced services to rural consumers any more 
quickly than do current licensees.116 Given these circum-
stances, it is preferable to avoid high enforcement costs and 
leave the spectrum in the hands of the licensee, who may de-
cide to deploy networks in the future. 
Complex problems demand complex answers. Geographic-
area licensing and secondary markets are appropriate for some 
services, but no currently accepted or proposed method offers a 
comprehensive solution to the inadequate provision of commu-
nications services in rural America. Rather, a multipronged 
approach that balances the needs of both large and small pro-
viders is necessary. Because different communications services 
present different technical and geographic obstacles, ap-
proaches will inevitably vary according to the service being 
provided. Therefore, the more tools the FCC has available in its 
spectrum toolbox, the more likely it is to successfully fix the 
leaks in the system. The remainder of this Note proposes an 
FCC regulation modeled after the doctrine of adverse posses-
sion, as an additional tool for increasing communications ser-
vices in rural areas. 
III.  THE DOCTRINE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION AS 
A MODEL FOR FCC REGULATIONS 
A. THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION 
Under the common law doctrine of adverse possession, a 
person may acquire another person’s interest in a property by 
 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. (stating that “adopting the ‘keep what you use’ approach may 
result in numerous administrative and legal costs”). 
 116. See, e.g., Reply Comments of AT&T, supra note 111, at 2. 
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possessing it for a specified time.117 To bring a successful claim, 
the adverse possessor must establish that the possession is ac-
tual, open and notorious, exclusive, hostile, and continuous.118 
Each element must have existed concurrently for the requisite 
duration, and failure to prove one element is fatal to the 
claim.119 The adverse possessor also must intend to claim title 
to the property possessed.120 
The adverse possessor can establish the first element, that 
the possession is actual, by entering onto the land121 and as-
serting that “dominion which owners usually exercise over 
similar lands in the same locality.”122 For example, actions like 
building fences,123 living on the land,124 and improving the 
property125 are all factors the court may take into consideration 
when determining whether possession was actual. Mere con-
structive possession or a subjective belief that the adverse pos-
sessor is in possession is insufficient.126 The open and notorious 
element requires that the true owner have either actual or con-
structive knowledge that the property is possessed by an-
other.127 The element recognizes that it would be unreasonable 
to take away the rights of those owners who were unable to as-
sert a claim because the adverse possession was indiscoverable. 
In order to prove exclusivity, the adverse possessor must 
“us[e] and enjoy[] the land as his own.”128 In other words, the 
true owner cannot be in joint possession of the property, 
whether the joint possessor be the true owner,129 a cotenant, a 
third person, or the public.130 Additionally, the adverse posses-
sor must exercise dominion over the land, making those efforts 
 
 117. See 7 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL 
PROPERTY § 1012 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2005). 
 118. See, e.g., In re Connor, 302 B.R. 509, 515 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2003); Pas-
coag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 211 (D.R.I. 
2002); 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession §§ 29, 65 (2005). 
 119. See, e.g., Belotti v. Bickhardt, 127 N.E. 239, 241 (N.Y. 1920). 
 120. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 30 (2005). 
 121. Id. § 35. 
 122. Id. § 37. 
 123. See id. § 40. 
 124. Id. § 39. 
 125. Id. § 41. 
 126. Id. § 34. 
 127. Id. § 55. 
 128. Ward v. Cochran, 150 U.S. 597, 606 (1893) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
 129. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 59 (2005). 
 130. Id. § 60. 
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expected of a reasonable owner to eject trespassers and other-
wise use the land.131 
Jurisdictions differ on what an adverse possessor must do 
to establish hostility. Some jurisdictions require merely that 
the adverse possessor claim ownership over the property to es-
tablish that the possession is hostile to the rights of the true 
owner.132 In such jurisdictions, it is irrelevant whether the ad-
verse possessor subjectively believes he has title to the prop-
erty.133 Other jurisdictions, however, refuse to reward indi-
viduals who know they are acting wrongfully. These 
jurisdictions require that the adverse possessor have color of 
title, often a court judgment or document (such as a defective 
deed) that purports to give title, but is deficient in some re-
spect.134 Still other jurisdictions allow for a shorter statutory 
time period if the adverse possessor has color of title.135 The fi-
nal element, requiring that possession be continuous, merely 
reaffirms that the possession must last for the entire statutory 
period,136 which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.137 
These requirements generally are meant to encourage the 
true owner to take legal action to protect her rights if someone 
is trespassing on her property.138 The doctrine applies to both 
real and personal property;139 however, a person cannot ad-
versely possess property of the federal government.140 
Several different policy justifications support the adverse 
possession doctrine.141 First, insofar as an adverse possessor 
may use the doctrine defensively to prevent the true owner 
from bringing an action against him, it operates as a statute of 
limitations and saves courts from having to decide “stale 
 
 131. See id. § 58. 
 132. See id. § 64. 
 133. See Per C. Olson, Comment, Adverse Possession in Oregon: The Belief-
In-Ownership Requirement, 23 ENVTL. L. 1297, 1298 (1993) (“The majority of 
states disregard the claimant’s actual belief in ownership.”). 
 134. See, e.g., Weldon v. Heron, 432 P.2d 392, 393 (N.M. 1967). 
 135. E.g., Field Measurement Serv., Inc. v. Ives, 609 S.W.2d 615, 620 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1980). 
 136. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 149 (2005). 
 137. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-101 (2004) (eighteen-year period), 
with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-503 (2004) (fifteen-year period). 
 138. Ottavia v. Savarese, 155 N.E.2d 432, 435 (Mass. 1959); 2 C.J.S. Ad-
verse Possession § 29 (2005). 
 139. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession §§ 10, 315 (2005). 
 140. Id. § 12. 
 141. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse 
Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1127–28 (1984). 
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claims.”142 This justification recognizes that “the quality and 
quantity of evidentiary material deteriorates over time,” mak-
ing judicial resolution of claims more expensive, time-
consuming and inefficient.143 It also serves a repose function for 
potential defendants.144 Second, the doctrine quiets property ti-
tles and thereby facilitates property transfers.145 Limiting the 
time in which persons may lay claim to property decreases 
transaction and information costs involved in transferring 
property.146 For example, the doctrine limits the necessary 
scope of title searches.147 
Third, from the possessor’s perspective, the doctrine pro-
tects any reliance interest she may have from development of 
and investments in the property over time.148 The adverse pos-
sessor “gains title because she has justifiably relied on the true 
owner’s failure to eject her while she made obvious and lasting 
investments. The wrongfulness of her conduct diminishes in 
light of the titleholder’s complete failure to act.”149 Fourth, the 
doctrine recognizes that a true owner who fails to initiate ac-
tion against the adverse possessor has neglected to assert his 
rights and, in effect, has abandoned the property.150 Histori-
cally, the doctrine also recognized a societal interest in the de-
velopment of land.151 If another party was able to put fallow 
land to use, it was considered more valuable for society to have 
title in that person.152 
 
 142. Hewes v. Bruno, 424 A.2d 1144, 1145 (N.H. 1981); Merrill, supra note 
141, at 1128. 
 143. Merrill, supra note 141, at 1128. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1129. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 1131. 
 149. Olson, supra note 133, at 1297. 
 150. See Merrill, supra note 141, at 1130; 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 1 
(2005). 
 151. See Meyer v. Law, 287 So. 2d 37, 41 (Fla. 1973), superseded by statute, 
FLA. STAT. § 95.16 (1974). As people have come to realize the value of green 
space and environmental conservation, this justification has lost favor. See, 
e.g., John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 
CORNELL L. REV. 816 (1994). 
 152. See, e.g., Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 431, 435 (Wash. 1984) (“The 
doctrine of adverse possession was formulated at law for the purpose of, 
among others, assuring maximum utilization of land . . . .”); Sprankling, supra 
note 151, at 874 (noting Richard Posner’s claim that “adverse possession 
maximizes the combined utility of both the true owner and the claimant by 
shifting property—whether wild or developed land—to a higher-valued use”); 
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B. ADVERSE POSSESSION AS A MEANS OF LICENSE TRANSFER 
The Federal Communications Commission should enact 
regulations, modeled after the common law doctrine of adverse 
possession, as a means of license transfer between a licensee 
and an adverse possessor actually providing communications 
services in rural America. A rural provider can argue that the 
licensee, by allowing the spectrum to be adversely possessed, 
has effectively abandoned his rights to use the spectrum and 
any quasi-property rights he may have in the spectrum, even 
though that provider is unable to obtain fee simple title to the 
spectrum from the government.153 Under such a regulatory re-
gime, the adverse possessor could argue for a license transfer 
from the FCC for the portion of the spectrum adversely pos-
sessed. In effect, the FCC would create a new license for the 
adverse possessor over the relevant area and would modify the 
existing license to reflect changes in its geographic reach. The 
adverse possessor would not acquire private ownership rights 
in the spectrum; rather, he would obtain the rights to use the 
spectrum acquired under the license under terms negotiated 
with the FCC. 
As under traditional adverse possession doctrine, the regu-
latory scheme would require the rural communications pro-
vider to prove its possession was actual, open and notorious, 
hostile to the true owner’s claim of right, exclusive, and con-
tinuous for a statutorily prescribed amount of time.154 Actual 
possession likely would be the most difficult requirement to 
prove. The rural provider would show actual possession by 
proving its signal has covered a particular geographic area. Be-
cause factors such as atmospheric conditions and receiver qual-
ity affect the distance a signal travels,155 it may be difficult for 
the service provider to establish the boundaries of the area it 
actually served. In the alternative, an adverse possessor could 
demonstrate actual possession through customer locations. Un-
der such an approach, the license would reflect the area cover-
ing just past the reach of the customers served. The FCC could 
allow for a reasonable area of expansion as part of the new li-
cense terms. 
 
William B. Stoebuck, The Law of Adverse Possession in Washington, 35 WASH. 
L. REV. 53, 53 (1960). 
 153. See 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 12 (2005). 
 154. See supra notes 117–37 and accompanying text. 
 155. See EMERY, supra note 16, at 100–01. 
TONSAGER_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:17:13 AM 
1528 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1506 
 
The rural communications provider would have an easier 
time proving “open and notorious” possession. By broadcasting 
a signal, the provider puts the licensee on notice that another 
party is using its spectrum because the provider’s signal would 
interfere with the licensee’s signal and the licensee could pick 
up the signal by tuning into the relevant frequency. Similarly, 
because interference results when two signals are broadcast on 
the same frequency, broadcasting a signal free from interfer-
ence would prove exclusivity. 
Since only one user may successfully transmit information 
simultaneously over the same frequency without causing inter-
ference,156 the regulations would presume hostility. In order to 
counter the presumption, the licensee would need to prove that 
the rural provider had permission to use the signal. The FCC 
regulations would stipulate that proof of continuous possession 
will vary according to the service provided. For example, be-
cause a broadcast radio signal may go off air during the late 
night hours, a rural provider may satisfy the continuous ele-
ment even though it operates only between the hours of six 
a.m. and ten p.m. A rural provider of mobile phone services, 
however, would need to prove the services are available at all 
times, since phone service is needed around the clock. As more 
and more adaptive devices, like cognitive radios,157 are devel-
oped and enter the market, the continuous and uninterrupted 
use of spectrum will become, in a sense, impossible. Such adap-
tive devices are able to interact “with [their] environment to de-
termine transmitter parameters such as frequency, power, and 
modulation,”158 and consequently can use various frequencies 
as they become available. However, because such technology 
will allow for spectrum sharing without resulting interference, 
these technologies should not be considered interruptions in the 
possession. Rather, insofar as the rural communications service 
provider utilizes the spectrum in the same manner as would 
the prudent spectrum licensee for the requisite duration, it 
would meet the continuous possession requirement. 
Having proven each requirement, the rural provider would 
be granted a presumptive claim against the licensee for a li-
cense transfer. The licensee would have the opportunity to ar-
 
 156. See ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 100. 
 157. Michael J. Marcus, Unlicensed Cognitive Sharing of TV Spectrum: The 
Controversy at the Federal Communications Commission, IEEE COMM. MAG. 
May 2005, at 24, 24. 
 158. Id. 
TONSAGER_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:17:13 AM 
2006] SPECTRUM POLICY 1529 
 
gue that the adverse possessor is not operating in the public in-
terest, or to provide other arguments against transfer. The 
regulations would provide, however, that the licensee’s pay-
ment for the license at auction does not defeat the rural pro-
vider’s claim because payment for the license does not satisfy 
the public interest standard.159 
Through the license transfer, the rural provider would ac-
quire rights to use the portion of the spectrum adversely pos-
sessed. The regulations would also provide that the Commis-
sion may modify the terms of the license to better serve the 
public interest, convenience, and necessity. Allowing these 
types of adjustments to the terms of the license is a divergence 
from traditional adverse possession, which limits the title ac-
quired to that which the owner had.160 However, this regula-
tory provision would allow for flexibility and innovation in the 
types of services provided in rural areas. For example, modifi-
cations to the license might permit the adverse possessor to 
provide different services and use other technologies or could 
extend the length of the license period. 
C. THE STATUTORY PERIOD MUST ALLOW ENOUGH TIME FOR 
THE LICENSEE TO DEVELOP A PRIMARY FOOTPRINT 
The most problematic aspect of an adverse possession 
method would be determining how long the rural provider must 
adversely possess the spectrum before he can claim a license 
transfer. On the one hand, national providers need enough time 
to build networks in both urban and rural areas. It is economi-
cally inefficient for them to build in rural areas first, since they 
generally recover the costs associated with rural deployment 
through urban customers’ subscription charges.161 Instead, 
these providers often plan on expanding their primary foot-
prints into rural areas at a later date, or when technologies 
make deployment cheaper.162 
 
 
 159. The public interest standard is established in 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) 
(2000). 
 160. See POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 117, § 1012. 
 161. See Comments of Nextel Partners, supra note 101, at 4 (“While the 
company initially focused on building out the more populated areas in order to 
achieve sufficient customer numbers and hence the cash flow needed to arrive 
at a level of financial sustainability, Nextel Partners is now actively pushing 
coverage into more and more areas of low population density.”) 
 162. See id. at 4–5. 
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On the other hand, delays in providing rural service 
threaten not only economic development, education, and per-
sonal convenience, but also public safety. Any formulation of 
the public interest standard ought to support a regime that en-
courages deployment by one who can do it now, even if at the 
expense of someone who could do it later. Congress’s mandate 
to facilitate deployment in rural areas supports this conclu-
sion.163 While immediate deployment may not make keen fi-
nancial sense for national providers, the Commission is not at 
liberty to deal with rural areas as an afterthought.164 There-
fore, the statutory period should allow the provider sufficient 
time to build out its primary footprint. Filed comments indicate 
that five years is a sufficient period.165 
Critics will likely argue, as they do against spectrum rec-
lamation policies in general, that such a short statutory period 
would encourage uneconomic investment.166 Licensees would 
have to “choose between making uneconomic investments or 
losing spectrum in rural areas.”167 It is true that they would 
have to make that choice, but a rational, profit-motivated licen-
see will never choose an uneconomic investment. Not all spec-
 
 163. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 301 (2000). 
 164. See Reply Comments of Dobson Communications Corporation, Facili-
tating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural Areas and Promot-
ing Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based 
Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, at 7–8 (Feb. 14, 2005), http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/ 
prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6517288353 (“[C]arri-
ers serving rural areas need additional time to successfully implement their 
business plans, so while spectrum may go unused today, there is no reason to 
believe, with advances in technology and service offerings, that such spectrum 
will not be needed tomorrow as part of a company’s overall business plan.”). 
Unlike corporations, the FCC is prohibited from basing its licensing decisions 
on the likelihood of increased federal revenues. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (7)(b) (2000). 
 165. Comments of Nextel Partners, supra note 101, at 4 (claiming that 
Nextel Partners was able to complete deployment of its primary footprint 
within five years and that after those first five years, it then started the ex-
pansion phase of its footprint). 
 166. See, e.g., Reply Comments of Verizon Wireless, Facilitating the Provi-
sion of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural Areas and Promoting Opportunities 
for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT 
Docket No. 02-381, at 4 (Feb. 14, 2005), http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/ 
retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6517288322. 
 167. Reply Comments of Nextel Partners, Inc., Facilitating the Provision of 
Spectrum-Based Services to Rural Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Ru-
ral Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No. 
02-381, at 2 (Feb. 14, 2005), http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi? 
native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6517288298 [hereinafter Reply Comments of 
Nextel Partners]. 
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trum is created equal.168 To the extent that the geographic area 
bid upon exceeds the provider’s footprint, there would be 
steeply diminished marginal returns on the “unused” spectrum 
during the time it is being adversely possessed. Therefore, los-
ing the rights to use such spectrum through a license transfer 
would not diminish the current rate of return of the remaining 
spectrum license for the licensee. 
Moreover, even if the rural area spectrum did seem nomi-
nally valuable, the licensee would still invest first in utilizing 
urban area spectrum, for which deployment costs are lower and 
the number of potential consumers is higher. The provider 
would always choose to deploy in urban markets first because 
those markets are more profitable. Therefore, allowing adverse 
possessors to gain the rights to rural spectrum still would not 
encourage national providers to make unsound investments. 
D. THE COST OF PROVIDING SERVICES IN RURAL AMERICA: 
SOLVING AN UNBALANCED EQUATION 
Even though it is extremely expensive to deploy communi-
cations networks in rural areas where there are few paying 
customers, rural providers will build networks and provide ser-
vices to rural America. Small rural companies do not use the 
same economic calculus that national providers use. Many of 
these small rural providers are cooperatives,169 formed because 
members of the community realize that access to advanced 
communications services not only improves the quality of life 
for rural residents, but also ensures the survival of the commu-
nity.170 On an individual level, some members may want digital 
cell phone services so they can effectively dial 9-1-1 in case of 
an emergency; others may need broadband in order to keep a 
small business afloat. On a community-wide level, the avail-
ability of advanced communications services in small towns is a 
significant factor in attracting a business to an otherwise de-
serted Main Street.171 Recognizing the necessity of these ser-
 
 168. See EMERY, supra note 16, at 100–02. 
 169. See Comments of the NTCA 2005, supra note 90, at 1, 5 (“Half of 
NTCA’s [560+] members are organized as cooperatives.”); Comments of 
OPASTCO, supra note 95, at 2 (“OPASTCO is a national association of over 
550 small telecommunications carriers serving rural areas of the United 
States. Its members, which include both commercial companies and coopera-
tives, collectively serve over 3.5 million consumers.”). 
 170. See Comments of the NTCA 2005, supra note 90, at 5; Comments of 
the NTCA 2003, supra note 6, at 3. 
 171. See Lloyd, supra note 7, at 1. 
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vices, cooperatives may be willing to provide these services 
even if they are able to make only a small profit or break 
even.172 
Even if the rural provider is operating for profit, the eco-
nomic calculation varies from that of a national provider. Be-
cause rural companies operate at a local, rather than national 
level, they likely have a better sense of who their customers 
are, what services they need, and what price they can afford. 
This knowledge ought to reduce their need to invest in con-
sumer research and market testing. They may also be able to 
rely on word-of-mouth advertising to attract customers, rather 
than multimillion dollar campaigns.173 
Additionally, rural providers do not have the same oppor-
tunity costs as national providers. For the national provider, 
investment in a rural area involves the opportunity cost of not 
investing in more profitable urban markets. However, because 
the urban markets are not a part of the rural provider’s portfo-
lio, this opportunity cost is nonexistent. Finally, what seems 
like a small profit to a national provider may likely seem like 
significant cash to a small rural provider.174 
It is true that there is a risk that the licensee may defeat 
the rural provider’s adverse possession claim by bringing an in-
terference action against the provider at the FCC. To mitigate 
the potential for lost investment, the FCC could implement 
mechanisms to counter this threat. For example, the FCC could 
waive penalties for unauthorized transmission if the adverse 
possessor provided communications services in an unserved or 
underserved rural area.175 Additionally, new regulations could 
require that the licensee compensate the rural provider for im-
provements made to utilize the spectrum, like the building of 
towers and other construction. While the common law refuses 
 
 172. See, e.g., Comments of the NTCA 2005, supra note 90, at 3–5. 
 173. In the first nine months of 2005, Verizon spent about $247 million on 
advertising, while Comcast spent near $220 million. See AT&T Kicks Off Its 
Biggest Ever Ad Campaign, Reuters.com, Dec. 29, 2005, http://today.reuters 
.com/business/newsArticle.aspx?type=telecomm&storyID=nN295198. 
 174. For example, Cingular Wireless, L.L.C., the largest wireless provider 
in the United States, had 2004 sales of $19,436,000,000. Cingular Wireless 
L.L.C., Hoover’s In-Depth Company Records, Oct. 12, 2005, 2005 WLNR 
16521676. Meanwhile, Midwest Wireless Holdings, L.L.C., serving rural areas 
in Minnesota, Iowa, and Wisconsin, had 2004 sales of only $36,800,000. Mid-
west Wireless Holdings, L.L.C., Hoover’s In-Depth Company Records, Aug. 17, 
2005, 2005 WLNR 12928974. 
 175. For a discussion of penalties, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 501–04 (2000). 
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restitution when the trespasser has knowledge of a superior ti-
tle to the property,176 the proposed regulatory regime could dif-
fer. The former concerns private property, while the latter in-
volves usage rights contingent on promoting the public 
interest.177 Thus, insofar as the rural provider’s use of the spec-
trum was for the provision of communications service to un-
served consumers, the Commission could require compensation 
for such investments, despite the rural provider’s knowledge 
that its use is unlicensed. It is possible that the rural provider’s 
investments would not enrich the licensee. For example, the 
technology the adverse possessor invested in could be incom-
patible with that of the licensee. In such cases, the licensee and 
rural provider could negotiate a leasing or disaggregation 
agreement in lieu of restitution. Together, these regulatory 
provisions would protect the licensee’s interests in the spec-
trum and encourage rural providers to take the initial risk to 
serve ignored areas. 
License transfer by adverse possession secures the rural 
provider’s investment. Unlike a spectrum lease, which the li-
censee may not renew, a license transfer under the regulations 
would provide the adverse possessor with the licensee’s renewal 
expectancy.178 The FCC would renew the license as long as the 
transferee could demonstrate that its services met the public 
interest standard.179 Guaranteed license renewal180 would en-
courage rural providers to build out networks and provide ser-
vices in rural areas. 
E. ADVANTAGES OF THE ADVERSE POSSESSION APPROACH 
A regulatory adverse possession scheme would complement 
the statutorily mandated “public interest, convenience, and ne-
cessity” framework.181 Because the doctrine would more effi-
 
 176. See, e.g., Canal Bank v. Hudson, 111 U.S. 66, 80–81 (1883); James v. 
Bailey, 370 F. Supp. 469, 470–72 (D.V.I. 1974). 
 177. See supra Part I.B. 
 178. Sidak, supra note 46, at 98–100. 
 179. Cowles Broad., Inc. (WESH-TV), 86 F.C.C.2d 993 ¶¶ 60–74 (1981). 
 180. T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH ES-
TATE 121 (6th ed. 2003) (“The FCC was generally reluctant to deny renewals 
except in egregious cases.”); Reed E. Hundt, Keynote Address, A New Para-
digm For Broadcast Regulation, 15 J.L. & COM. 527, 533 (1996) (“[T]he Com-
mission for at least fifteen years has not taken away a single one of the ap-
proximately 1500 Television licenses or 10,000 radio licenses in this country 
for failure to serve the public interest.”). 
 181. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2000). 
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ciently allocate spectrum to providers who have demonstrated a 
desire and ability to provide communications services to other-
wise unserved or underserved rural residents, it meets the 
statutory standard.182 
Additionally, an adverse possession approach to spectrum 
aligns with many of the doctrine’s policy justifications. The his-
torical justification—that the law should encourage property 
use and development183—applies with particular force to spec-
trum. Spectrum use, unlike land use,184 cannot degrade the 
quality of or “pollute” the spectrum. Indeed, the purpose of 
spectrum management policy is to encourage the efficient allo-
cation of spectrum so as to maximize the number and types of 
communications services available to the public.185 Applying 
the adverse possession doctrine to spectrum would encourage 
the use and development of licensed spectrum. 
The reliance186 and the abandonment187 justifications for 
adverse possession are also important in the spectrum context. 
Adverse possessors of spectrum usage rights likely would have 
to make some capital investment in order to provide rural ser-
vices.188 The proposed regulatory scheme would protect this re-
 
 182. See id. §§ 151, 309(j)(3)–(4); Due Diligence Announcement for the Up-
coming Auction of Licenses in the Lower 700 MHz Band Scheduled for July 20, 
2005, 20 F.C.C.R. 9986 (2005) (“In considering such regulatory requests, the 
Commission will consider whether grant of the request would result in public 
interest benefits, such as making new or expanded public safety or other wire-
less services available to consumers or deploying wireless service to rural or 
other underserved communities.”); Federal-State Joint Board on Universal 
Service, 35 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 958, 972 (Mar. 17, 2005) (“The public inter-
est . . . must be analyzed in a manner that is consistent with the purposes of 
the Act itself, including . . . promoting the deployment of advanced telecom-
munications and information services to all regions of the nation, including 
rural and high-cost areas.” (citations omitted)). 
 183. See Meyer v. Law, 287 So. 2d 37, 41 (Fla. 1973), superseded by statute, 
FLA. STAT. § 95.16 (1974). 
 184. See Sprankling, supra note 151, at 854–62. 
 185. 47 U.S.C. § 151; see also Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Ser-
vice, 31 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 586, 607 (Dec. 31, 2003) (separate statement of 
Comm’r Adelstein) (“We cannot afford to let spectrum lie fallow. It is not a 
property right, but a contingent right to use a public resource—it should be 
put to use for the benefit of as many people as possible.”) For some services, 
the FCC even mandates the level of service that must be provided under the 
license. 47 C.F.R. § 27.14(a) (2005). 
 186. Merrill, supra note 141, at 1131. 
 187. See id. at 1130; 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 1 (2005). 
 188. These investments would be relatively small in low-cost markets, like 
radio, but would be potentially quite high in others, like mobile phones. Con-
sequently, the proposed scheme anticipates that existing providers are the 
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liance interest by rewarding rural providers for the invest-
ments they make during the statutorily defined time period.189 
As in the land context, the spectrum licensee who failed to as-
sert his rights against the adverse possessor would in effect 
abandon those rights. Such abandonment suggests that the ad-
verse possessor should receive the rights to the spectrum in-
stead. 
National providers argue that insofar as rural providers 
face the same high investment costs to deploy networks in rural 
areas, rural providers will be no more able to serve rural areas 
than the licensee and thus do not deserve a license transfer.190 
However, the adverse possession approach defeats this argu-
ment. By definition, maintaining the adverse possession claim 
would require that the rural provider be capable of deploying a 
network in an area the licensee has ignored. 
Unlike keep-what-you-use programs, which arguably may 
force national carriers to make “uneconomic investment[s] in 
rural areas,”191 the adverse possession approach only penalizes 
licensees when investment in the rural area would have pro-
vided an economic benefit from the public’s perspective. In 
other words, the rural communications service provider argu-
ing for a license transfer has proven that deployment is eco-
nomically viable. This demonstrates that the licensee’s decision 
not to deploy there, although potentially a sound decision from 
the company’s perspective, was not economically sound from 
the public interest perspective. 
Contrary to the keep-what-you-use method, which requires 
extensive FCC oversight, adverse possession is a hands-off, 
market-based system. The adverse possessor would discover 
fallow spectrum, find a way to use it in an economically feasible 
fashion, and enforce the regulations by bringing a transfer 
 
most likely to pursue adverse possession claims. In those instances, adverse 
possession would allow existing providers, who have already made significant 
capital investments, to expand their existing services or coverage area. 
 189. Or, as discussed in Part III.D, the regulations would protect the reli-
ance interest by compensating an adverse possessor for his investment if the 
licensee brings an interference action before the adverse possession claim rip-
ens. 
 190. Reply Comments of AT&T, supra note 111, at 6; Comments of Nextel 
Partners, Inc., Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural 
Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to Pro-
vide Spectrum-Based Services, WT Docket No. 02-381, at 18–19 (Dec. 29, 
2003), http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_ 
document=6515383231. 
 191. Reply Comments of Nextel Partners, supra note 167, at 2. 
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claim before the FCC. Such a market mechanism would sup-
plement spectrum management policy when the secondary 
markets fail. 
Finally, an adverse possession method would strike a fair 
balance between large, national carriers and small, rural pro-
viders. On the one hand, national providers could retain access 
to their spectrum rights simply by being responsible stewards 
of those rights. Even if a national provider were initially unable 
to deploy in rural areas, he would always have the opportunity 
to protect his spectrum license by bringing an interference ac-
tion at the FCC. On the other hand, where national providers 
neglect their public interest duties, a rural provider would be 
able to answer the call and ensure that all consumers, includ-
ing those in remote rural regions, have access to the latest 
communications services. 
CONCLUSION 
Rural Americans rely as heavily on advanced communica-
tions services for everyday needs and public safety as those 
who reside in large cities. Inadequate communications services 
in rural areas also affect people who travel through those ar-
eas. The wireless communications industry is undergoing great 
change, with many technologies making the leap from analog to 
digital services. The FCC must take every care to advance Con-
gress’s command that rural Americans not be left behind in the 
digital communications revolution. 
To fulfill this mandate, the FCC should adopt regulations 
based on the common law doctrine of adverse possession as a 
means of spectrum license transfer. Such a regime would offer 
many benefits, including greater efficiency in spectrum alloca-
tion and the potential for increased communications services in 
rural America. The adverse possession approach would sup-
plement existing federal spectrum management policy to create 
a comprehensive solution to the problem of inadequate access 
to spectrum in rural areas. 
